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Abstract. Intensionality is bound to global mappings from sets of pos-
sible worlds to truth states relative to a set of predicates, witness schemes
like Montague Grammar. We discuss this aspect in the frame of rough
set theory where concepts arise as collections of objects constrained by
bounds on values of chosen sets of attributes. We apply the idea of a
rough inclusion as similarity measure for objects, and rough inclusions
measure truth state values of predicates relative to possible worlds –
granules of objects.
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1 Introductory Notions
We give in a nutshell basic notions relevant to our discussion, cf. [13], [4]. An
information system is a pair (푈,퐴), of a set of entities/objects 푈 with a set 퐴 of
attributes. Each attribute is a mapping on 푈 with values in a set 푉푎; a decision
system is a triple (푈,퐴, 푑), where the attribute 푑, the decision, represents the
external knowledge about 푈 by an oracle/expert.
Concepts with respect to a given data are deﬁned formally as subsets of the
universe 푈 . Concepts can be written down in the language of descriptors.
For an attribute 푎 and its value 푣, the descriptor deﬁned by the pair 푎, 푣 is
the atomic formula (푎 = 푣). Descriptors can be made into formulas by means
of sentential connectives: ∨,∧,¬,⇒: formulas of descriptor logics are elements
of the smallest set which contains all atomic descriptors and is closed under the
mentioned above sentential connectives. Introducing for each object 푢 ∈ 푈 its
information set 퐼푛푓(푢) = {(푎 = 푎(푢)) : 푎 ∈ 퐴}, we can deﬁne the basic indis-
cernibility relation 퐼푁퐷(퐴) = {(푢, 푣) : 퐼푛푓(푢) = 퐼푛푓(푣)}. Replacing 퐴 with a
subset 퐵 of attribute set, we deﬁne the B–indiscernibility relation 퐼푁퐷(퐵).
A descriptor (푎 = 푣) is interpreted semantically in the universe 푈 ; the mean-
ing [푎 = 푣] of this descriptor is the concept {푢 ∈ 푈 ; 푎(푢) = 푣}. Meanings of
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atomic descriptors are extended to meanings of formulas of descriptor logic by
recursive conditions,
[푝 ∨ 푞]=[푝] ∪ [푞]; [푝 ∧ 푞]=[푝] ∩ [푞]; [¬푝]=푈 ∖ [푝] etc. etc.
Any relation IND(B) partitions the universe 푈 into blocks – equivalence
classes [푢]퐵 of IND(B), regarded as elementary 퐵–exact concepts. Unions of
families of elementary 퐵–exact concepts constitute 퐵–exact concepts.
In terms of exact concepts, one can express dependencies among attributes
[13]: in the simplest case, a set 퐷 of attributes depends functionally on a set
퐶 of attributes if and only if 퐼푁퐷(퐶) ⊆ 퐼푁퐷(퐷); the meaning is that any
class [
⋀
푎∈퐶(푎 = 푣푎)] is contained in a unique class [
⋀
푎∈퐷(푎 = 푤푎)] so there
is a mapping 푈/퐼푁퐷(퐶) → 푈/퐼푁퐷(퐷). We write down this dependency as
퐶 7→ 퐷.
Dependency need not be functional; in such case, the relation 퐼푁퐷(퐶) ⊆
퐼푁퐷(퐷) can be replaced [13] with a weaker notion of a (C,D)–positive set
which is deﬁned as the union 푃표푠퐶(퐷) =
∪{[푢]퐶 : [푢]퐶 ⊆ [푢]퐷}; clearly then,
퐼푁퐷(퐶)∣푃표푠퐶(퐷) ⊆ 퐼푁퐷(퐷). In [13] a factor 훾(퐵,퐶) = ∣푃표푠퐵(퐶)∣∣푈 ∣ was pro-
posed as the measure of degree of dependency of 퐷 on 퐶, where ∣푋∣ is the
number of elements in 푋. This form of dependency is denoted symbolically as
퐶 ↪→훾 퐷.
Dependencies have a logical form in logic of descriptors as sets of implications





(푎 = 푤푎); (1)
in a particular case of a decision system (푈,퐴, 푑), dependencies of the form
퐶 ↪→훾 {푑} are called decision algorithms and individual relations of the form⋀
푎∈퐶(푎 = 푣푎) ⇒ (푑 = 푤푑) are said to be decision rules. There have been
proposed various measures of the truth degree of a decision rule, under the
name of a rule quality, see, e.g., [13].
In descriptor logic setting, a decision rule 푟 : 훼퐶 ⇒ 훽푑 is said to be true
if and only if the meaning [푟] = 푈 which is equivalent to the condition that
[훼퐶 ] ⊆ [훽푑].
The above introduced constituents: entities, indiscernibility relations, con-
cepts, dependencies, form building blocks from which knowledge is discovered as
a set of statements about those constituents.
It is our purpose to construct a formal logical system in which one would be
able to deﬁne values of truth states of formulas of knowledge, decision rules in
particular, in a formal manner, preserving the notion of truth as recalled above,
but in a localized version, with respect to a particular exact concept of entities.
Rough set theory discerns between exact concepts which are unions of indis-
cernibility classes and rough concepts which are not any union of indiscernibility
classes. Passing from rough to exact concepts is achieved by means of approxi-
mations: the lower approximation to a concept 푊 ⊆ 푈 is deﬁned as 푊 = {푢 ∈
푈 : [푢]퐴 ⊆푊}, and, the upper approximation 푊 = {푢 ∈ 푈 : [푢]퐴 ∩푊 ∕= ∅}.
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Any attempt at assigning various degrees of truth to logical statements places
one in the realm of many–valued logic. These logics describe formally logical
functors as mappings on the set of truth values/states into itself hence they
operate a fortiori with values of statements typically as fractions or reals in the
unit interval [0, 1], see in this respect, e.g., [6], [7], [8], [9], and, as a survey, see
[4].
In many of those logics, the functor of implication is interpreted as the resid-
ual implication induced by a continuous t–norm. We recall, cf., e.g., [4] or [?]
that a t–norm is a mapping 푡 : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] which satisﬁes the conditions,
(TN1)푡(푥, 푦) = 푡(푦, 푥) (symmetry);
(TN2) 푡(푥, 푡(푦, 푧)) = 푡(푡(푥, 푦), 푧) (associativity);
(TN3) 푡(푥, 1) = 푥; 푡(푥, 0) = 0 (boundary conditions);
(TN4) 푥 > 푥′ implies 푡(푥, 푦) ≥ 푡(푥′), 푦) (monotonicity coordinate–wise);
and additionally,
(TN5) 푡 can be continuous.
A continuous t–norm is Archimedean in case 푡(푥, 푥) = 푥 for 푥 = 0, 1 only;
for such t–norms, it was shown, see [5], that a formula holds,
푡(푥, 푦) = 푔(푓(푥) + 푓(푦)), (2)
with a continuous decreasing function 푓 : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and 푔 – the pseudo–
inverse to 푓 .
Examples of Archimedean t–norms are,
The L̷ukasiewicz t–norm 퐿(푥, 푦) = 푚푎푥{0, 푥+ 푦 − 1};
The product (Menger) t–norm 푃 (푥, 푦) = 푥 ⋅ 푦.
The two are up to an automorphism on [0,1] the only Archimedean t–norms
[12].
An example of a t–norm which is not any Archimedean is
Minimum t–norm 푀푖푛(푥, 푦) = 푚푖푛{푥, 푦}. It is known, see [1], that for Min
the representation (2) with 푓 continuous does not exist.
1.1 Residual implications
Residual implication 푥⇒푡 푦 induced by a continuous t–norm 푡 is deﬁned as,
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푥⇒푡 푦 = 푚푎푥{푧 : 푡(푥, 푧) ≤ 푦}. (3)
As 푡(푥, 1) = 푥 for each t–norm, it follows that 푥 ⇒푡 푦 = 1 when 푥 ≤ 푦 for
each t–norm 푡.
In case 푥 > 푦, one obtains various semantic interpretations of implication
depending on the choice of 푡, see, e.g., [4] for a review. Exemplary cases are,
The L̷ukasiewicz implication 푥⇒퐿 푦 = 푚푖푛{1, 1− 푥+ 푦}, see [7];
The Goguen implication 푥⇒푃 푦 = 푦푥 ;
The Goedel implication 푥⇒푀푖푛 푦 = 푦.
1.2 Logics of residual implications vs. logical containment in
decision rules
In logics based on implication given by residua of t–norms, negation is deﬁned
usually as ¬푥 = 푥⇒푡 0. Thus, the L̷ukasiewicz negation is ¬퐿푥 = 1−푥 whereas
Goguen as well as Goedel negation is ¬퐺푥 = 1 for x=0 and is 0 for 푥 > 0.
Other connectives are deﬁned with usage of the t–norm itself as semantics for
the strong conjunction and ordinary conjunction and disjunction are interpreted
semantically as, respectively, min, max. Resulting logics have been a subject of
an intensive research, cf., a monograph [4].
In this approach a rule 훼⇒ 훽 is evaluated by evaluating the truth state [훼]
as well as the truth state [훽] and then computing the values of [훼] ⇒푡 [훽] for a
chosen t–norm 푡. Similarly other connectives are evaluated.
In the rough set context, this approach would pose the problem of evaluating
the truth state of a conjunct 훼 of descriptors; to this end, one can invoke the idea
of L̷ukasiewicz [6] and assign to 훼 a value [훼]퐿 =
[훼]
∣푈 ∣ , where [훼] is the meaning
already deﬁned, i.e., the set {푢 ∈ 푈 : 푢 ∣= 훼}. Clearly, this approach does not
take into account the logical containment or its lack between 훼 and 훽, and this
fact makes the many–valued approach of a small use when data mining tasks
are involved.
For this reason, we propose an approach to logic of decision rules which is
based on the idea of measuring the state of truth of a formula against a concept
constructed as a granule of knowledge; concepts can be regarded as ”worlds”
and our logic becomes intensional, cf., e.g., [2], [11]: logical evaluations at a given
world are extensions of the intension which is the mapping on worlds valued in
the set of logical values of truth.
To implement this program, we need to develop the following tools:
1 a tool to build worlds, i.e, a granulation methodology based on a formal
mechanism of granule formation and analysis;
2 a methodology for evaluating states of truth of formulas against worlds.
In both cases 1, 2, our approach exploits tools provided by rough mereology,
see, e.g., [14] Similarity measures – rough inclusions – provide means for all
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necessary deﬁnitions of relevant notions. Here we dispense with any account of
granulation for space’s sake.
2 Rough inclusions: The basic facts
We now recall some exemplary means for inducing rough inclusions along with
some new results; for a general discussion, cf., e.g. [14].
Rough inclusions on [0,1]
Proposition 1. [14]. For each continuous t–norm 푡, the residual implication
⇒푡 deﬁnes a rough inclusion by 휇푡(푥, 푦, 푟)⇔ 푥⇒푡 푦 ≥ 푟.
There exist rough inclusions not deﬁnable in this way, e.g., the drastic rough
inclusion,
휇0(푥, 푦, 푟) if and only if either 푥 = 푦 and 푟 = 1 or 푟 = 0. (4)
Clearly, 휇0 is associated with the ingredient relation = and, a fortiori, the
part relation is empty, whereas any rough inclusion 휇 induced by a residual
implication in the sense of Prop. 1, is associated to the ingredient relation ≤
with the part relation <.
In case of Archimedean t–norms, it is well–known that a representation for-
mula holds for them, see (2), which implies the residual implication in the form,
푥⇒ 푦 = 푔(푓(푥)− 푓(푦)). (5)
This formula will be useful in case of information systems which is going to be
discussed in the next section.
Rough inclusions on sets For our purpose it is essential to extend rough
inclusions to sets; we use the t–norm 푡퐿 of L̷ukasiewicz, along with the represen-
tation 푡퐿(푟, 푠) = 푔(푓(푟) + 푓(푠)) already mentioned in (2), which in this case is
푔(푦) = 1− 푦, 푓(푥) = 1− 푥. We denote these kind of inclusions with the generic
symbol 휈.
For sets 푋,푌 ⊆ 푈 , we let,
휈퐿(푋,푌, 푟) if and only if 푔(
∣푋 ∖ 푌 ∣
∣푋∣ ) ≥ 푟; (6)
as 푔(푦) = 1− 푦, we have that 휈퐿(푋,푌, 푟) holds if and only if ∣푋∩푌 ∣∣푋∣ ≥ 푟. Let us
observe that 휈퐿 is regular, i.e., 휈퐿(푋,푌, 1) if and only if 푋 ⊆ 푌 and 휈퐿(푋,푌, 푟)
only with 푟 = 0 if and only if 푋 ∩ 푌 = ∅.
Thus, the ingredient relation associated with a regular rough inclusion is
the improper containment ⊆ whereas the underlying part relation is the strict
containment ⊂.
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Other rough inclusion on sets which we exploit is the 3–valued rough inclusion
휈3 deﬁned via the formula, see [14],
휈3(푋,푌, 푟)if and only if
⎧⎨⎩푋 ⊆ 푌 and 푟 = 1푋 ∩ 푌 = ∅ and 푟 = 0
푟 = 12 otherwise,
(7)
The rough inclusion 휈3 is also regular.
Finally, we consider the drastic rough inclusion on sets, 휈1,
휈1(푋,푌, 푟) if and only if
{
푋 = 푌 and 푟 = 1
푋 ∕= 푌 and 푟 = 0. (8)
Clearly, 휈1 is not regular.
3 Rough Mereological Logics
Given an information system (푈,퐴), along with a rough inclusion 휈 on the
subsets of the universe 푈 , for a collection of predicates (unary) 푃푟, interpreted
in the universe 푈 (meaning that for each predicate 휙 ∈ 푃푟 the meaning [휙] is a
subset of 푈), we deﬁne the intensional logic 푔푟푚휈 on 푃푟 by assigning to each
predicate 휙 in 푃푟 its intension 퐼휈(휙) deﬁned by the family of extensions 퐼
∨
휈 (푔)
at particular granules 푔, as,
퐼∨휈 (푔)(휙) ≥ 푟 if and only if 휈(푔, [휙], 푟). (9)
With respect to the rough inclusion 휈퐿, the formula (9) becomes,
퐼∨휈퐿(푔)(휙) ≥ 푟 iﬀ
∣푔 ∩ [휙]∣
∣푔∣ ≥ 푟. (10)
The counterpart for 휈3 is speciﬁed by deﬁnition (7).
We say that a formula 휙 interpreted in the universe 푈 of an information system
(푈,퐴) is true at a granule 푔 with respect to a rough inclusion 휈 if and only if
퐼∨휈 (푔)(휙) = 1.
Proposition 2. For every regular rough inclusion 휈, a formula 휙 interpreted in
the universe 푈 , with meaning [휙], is true at a granule 푔 with respect to 휈 if and
only if 푔 ⊆ [휙]. In particular, for a decision rule 푟 : 푝⇒ 푞 in the descriptor logic,
the rule 푟 is true at a granule 푔 with respect to a regular rough inclusion 휈 if and
only if 푔 ∩ [푝] ⊆ [푞].
Indeed, truth of 휙 at 푔 means that 휈(푔, [휙], 1) which in turn, by regularity of
휈 is equivalent to the inclusion 푔 ⊆ [휙].
We will say that a formula 휙 is a theorem of our intensional logic if and only
if 휙 is true at every world 푔.
The preceding proposition implies that
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Proposition 3. For every regular rough inclusion 휈, a formula 휙 is a theorem
if and only if 퐶푙푠(푎푙푙 푔푟푎푛푢푙푒푠 푔 푐표푛푠푖푑푒푟푒푑) ⊆ [휙]; in the case when granules
considered cover the universe 푈 this condition simpliﬁes to [휙] = 푈 . This means
for a decision rule 푝⇒ 푞 that it is a theorem if and only if [푝] ⊆ [푞].
3.1 Relations to many–valued logics
Here we examine some axiomatic schemes for many–valued logics with respect
to their meanings under the stated in introductory section proviso that [푝 ⇒
푞] = (푈 ∖ [푝]) ∪ [푞], [¬푝] = 푈 ∖ [푝].
We examine ﬁrst axiom schemes for 3–valued L̷ukasiewicz logic investigated
in [15] (Wajsberg schemes).
(W1) 푞 ⇒ (푝⇒ 푞);
(W2) (푝⇒ 푞)⇒ ((푞 ⇒ 푟)⇒ (푝⇒ 푟));
(W3) ((푝⇒ ¬푝)⇒ 푝)⇒ 푝;
(W4) (¬푞 ⇒ ¬푝)⇒ (푝⇒ 푞).
We have as meanings of those formulas,
[푊1] = (푈 ∖ [푞]) ∪ (푈 ∖ [푝]) ∪ [푞] = 푈 ;
[푊2] = ([푝] ∖ [푞]) ∪ ([푞] ∖ [푟]) ∪ (푈 ∖ [푝]) ∪ [푟] = 푈 ;
[푊3] = (푈 ∖ [푝]) ∪ [푝] = 푈 ;
[푊4] = ([푝] ∖ [푞]) ∪ [푞] = 푈 .
Thus, all instances of Wajsberg axiom schemes for 3–valued L̷ukasiewicz logic
are theorems of our intensional logic in case of regular rough inclusions on sets.
The deduction rule in 3–valued L̷ukasiewicz logic is Modus Ponens: 푝,푝⇒푞푞 .
In our setting this is a valid deduction rule: if 푝, 푝 ⇒ 푞 are theorems than 푞
is a theorem. Indeed, if [푝] = 푈 = [푝⇒ 푞] then [푞] = 푈 .
We have obtained
Proposition 4. Each theorem of 3–valued L̷ukasiewicz logic is a theorem of
rough mereological granular logic in case of a regular rough inclusion on sets.
In an analogous manner, we examine axiom schemes for inﬁnite valued L̷uka-
siewicz logic, proposed by L̷ukasiewicz [9], with some reﬁnements showing redun-
dancy of a scheme due to Meredith [10] and Chang [3], cf., in this respect [?] for
an account of the reasoning.
(L1) 푞 ⇒ (푝⇒ 푞);
(L2) (푝⇒ 푞)⇒ ((푞 ⇒ 푟)⇒ (푝⇒ 푟));
(L3) ((푞 ⇒ 푝)⇒ 푝)⇒ ((푝⇒ 푞)⇒ 푞);
(L4) (¬푞 ⇒ ¬푝)⇒ (푝⇒ 푞).
As (L1) is (W1), (L2) is (W2) and (L4) is (W4), it remains to examine (L3). In
this case, we have [(푞 ⇒ 푝) ⇒ 푝]=(푈 ∖ [푞 ⇒ 푝]) ∪ [푝])=(푈 ∖ ((푈 ∖ [푞]) ∪ [푝])) ∪
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[푝]=([푞] ∖ [푝]) ∪ [푝]= [푞] ∪ [푝]. Similarly, [(푝 ⇒ 푞) ⇒ 푞] is [푝] ∪ [푞] by symmetry,
and ﬁnally the meaning [퐿3] is (푈 ∖ ([푞] ∪ [푝])) ∪ [푝] ∪ [푞] = 푈 .
It follows that,
all instances of axiom schemes for inﬁnite–valued L̷ukasiewicz logic are the-
orems of rough mereological granular logic.
As Modus Ponens remains a valid deduction rule in inﬁnite–valued case, we
obtain, analogous to Prop. 4,
Proposition 5. Each theorem of inﬁnite–valued L̷ukasiewicz logic is a theorem
of rough mereological granular logic in case of a regular rough inclusion on sets.
It follows from Prop.5 that all theorems of Basic logic, see [4], i.e. logic which
is intersection of all many–valued logics with implications evaluated semantically
by residual implications of continuous t–norms are theorems of rough mereolog-
ical granular logic.
The assumption of regularity of a rough inclusion 휈 is essential: considering
the drastic rough inclusion 휈1, we ﬁnd that an implication 푝⇒ 푞 is true only at
the world (푈 ∖ [푝])∪ [푞], so it is not any theorem – this concerns all schemes (W)
and (L) above as they are true only at the global world 푈 .
3.2 Graded notion of truth
The graded relaxation of truth is given obviously by the condition, a formula 휙
is true to a degree at least 푟 at 푔, 휈 if and only if 퐼∨휈 (푔)(휙) ≥ 푟, i.e., 휈(푔, [휙], 푟)
holds. In particular, 휙 is false at 푔, 휈 if and only if 퐼∨휈 (푔)(휙) ≥ 푟 implies 푟 = 0,
i.e. 휈(푔, [휙], 푟) implies 푟 = 0.
The following properties hold.
1. For each regular 휈, a formula 훼 is true at 푔, 휈 if and only if ¬훼 is false at
푔, 휈.
2. For 휈 = 휈퐿, 휈3, 퐼
∨
휈 (푔)(¬훼) ≥ 푟 if and only if 퐼∨휈 (푔)(훼) ≥ 푠 implies 푠 ≤ 1− 푟.
3. For 휈 = 휈퐿, 휈3, the implication 훼⇒ 훽 is true at 푔 if and only if 푔 ∩ [훼] ⊆ [훽]
and 훼⇒ 훽 is false at 푔 if and only if 푔 ⊆ [훼] ∖ [훽].
4. For 휈 = 휈퐿, if 퐼
∨
휈 (푔)(훼⇒ 훽) ≥ 푟 then ⇒퐿 (푡, 푠) ≥ 푟 where 퐼∨휈 (푔)(훼) ≥ 푡 and
퐼∨휈 (푔)(훽) ≥ 푠.
The functor ⇒ in 4. is the L̷ukasiewicz implication of many–valued logic: ⇒푡퐿
(푡, 푠) = 푚푖푛{1, 1− 푡+ 푠}.
Further analysis should be split into the case of 휈퐿 and the case of 휈3 as the
two diﬀer essentially with respect to the form of reasoning they imply.
4 Reasoning with 흂푳
The last property 4. shows in principle that the value of 퐼∨휈 (푔)(훼⇒ 훽) is bounded
from above by the value of 퐼∨휈 (푔)(훼)⇒푡퐿 퐼∨휈 (푔)(훽)).
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This suggests that the idea of collapse attributed to S. Lesniewski can be ap-
plied to formulas of rough mereological logic in the following form: for a formula
푞(푥) we denote by the symbol 푞∗ the formula 푞 regarded as a sentential formula
(i.e., with variable symbols removed) subject to relations:
(¬푞(푥))∗ is ¬(푞(푥)∗) and (푝(푥) ⇒ 푞(푥))∗ is 푝(푥)∗ ⇒ 푞(푥)∗. As the value
[푞∗]푔 of the formula 푞(푥)∗ at a granule 푔, we take the value of
∣푔∩[푞(푥)]∣
∣푔∣ , i.e,
푎푟푔푚푎푥푟{휈퐿(푔, [푞∗]푔, 푟)}. Thus, item 4 above can be rewritten in the form.
퐼∨휈 (푔)(훼⇒ 훽) ≤ [훼∗]푔 ⇒푡퐿 [훽∗]푔. (11)
The following statement is then obvious:
if 훼 ⇒ 훽 is true at 푔 then the collapsed formula has the value 1 of truth at
the granule 푔 in the L̷ukasiewicz logic.
This gives a necessity condition for veriﬁcation of implications of rough mere-
ological logics:
if ⇒퐿 ([훼∗]푔, [훽∗]푔) < 1 then the implication 훼⇒ 훽 is not true at 푔.
This concerns in particular decision rules:
for a decision rule 푝(푣)⇒ 푞(푣), the decision rule is true on a granule 푔 if and
only if [푝∗]푔 ≤ [푞∗]푔.
5 Reasoning with 흂3
In case of 휈3, one can check on the basis of deﬁnitions that 퐼
∨
휈 (푔)(¬훼) ≥ 푟 if and
only if 퐼∨휈 (푔)(훼) ≤ 1 − 푟; thus the negation functor in rough mereological logic
based on 휈3 is the same as the negation functor in the 3–valued L̷ukasiewicz
logic. For implication, the relations between granular rough mereological logic
and 3–valued logic of L̷ukasiewicz follow from truth tables for respective functors
of negation and implication.
Table 1 shows truth values for implication in 3–valued logic of L̷ukasiewicz.
We recall that these values obey the implication 푥 ⇒퐿 푦 = 푚푖푛{1, 1 − 푥 + 푦}.
Values of 푥 correspond to rows and values of 푦 correspond to columns in Table
1.
Table 1. Truth values for implication in 퐿3
⇒ 0 1 1
2
0 1 1 1







Table 2 shows values of implication for rough mereological logic based on 휈3.
Values are shown for the extension 퐼∨휈 (푔)(푝⇒ 푞) of the implication 푝⇒ 푞. Rows
correspond to 푝, columns correspond to 푞.
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Table 2. Truth values for implication 푝⇒ 푞 in logic based on 휈3
⇒ 퐼∨휈3(푔)(푞) = 0 퐼∨휈3(푔)(푞) = 1 퐼∨휈3(푔)(푞) = 12
퐼∨휈3(푔)(푝) = 0 1 1 1








1 1 when 푔 ∩ [훼] ⊆ [훽]; 1
2
otherwise
We verify values shown in Table 2. First, we consider the case when
퐼∨푛푢3(푔)(푝) = 0, i.e., the case when 푔 ∩ [푝] = ∅. As 푔 ⊆ (푈 ∖ [푝])∪ [푞] for every
value of [푞], we have only values of 1 in the ﬁrst row of Table 2.
Assume now that 퐼∨푛푢3(푔)(푝) = 1, i.e., 푔 ⊆ [푝]. As 푔 ∩ (푈 ∖ [푝]) = ∅, the value
of 퐼∨휈 (푔)(푝⇒ 푞) depends only on a relation between 푔 and [푞]. In case 푔∩ [푞] = ∅,
the value in Table 2 is 0, in case 푔 ⊆ [푞] the value in Table 2 is 1, and in case
퐼∨휈3(푔)(푞) =
1
2 , the value in Table 2 is
1
2 .
Finally, we consider the case when 퐼∨휈3(푔)(푝) =
1
2 , i.e., 푔 ∩ [푝] ∕= ∅ ∕= 푔 ∖ [푝].
In case 푔 ∩ [푞] = ∅, we have 푔 ∩ ((푈 ∖ [푝]) ∪ [푞]) ∕= ∅ and it is not true that
푔 ⊆ ((푈 ∖ [푝]) ∪ [푞]) so the value in table is 12 . In case 푔 ⊆ [푞], the value in Table
is clearly 1. The case when 퐼∨휈3(푔)(푞) =
1
2 remains. Clearly, when 푔 ∩ [푝] ⊆ [푞],
we have 푔 ⊆ (푈 ∖ [푝]) ∪ [푞] so the value in Table is 1; otherwise, the value is 12 .
Thus, negation in both logic is semantically treated in the same way, whereas




2 , when 푔 ∩ [푝] is not any subset of [푞].
It follows from these facts that given a formula 훼 and its collapse 훼∗, we
have,
퐼∨휈3(푔)(¬훼) = [(¬훼)∗]퐿3 , 퐼∨휈3(푔)(훼⇒ 훽) ≤ [(훼⇒ 훽)∗]퐿3 . (12)
A more exact description of implication in both logics is as follows.
Proposition 6. 1. If 퐼∨푛푢3(푔)(훼⇒ 훽) = 1 then [(훼⇒ 훽)∗]퐿3 = 1;
2. If 퐼∨푛푢3(푔)(훼⇒ 훽) = 0 then [(훼⇒ 훽)∗]퐿3 = 0;
3. If 퐼∨푛푢3(푔)(훼 ⇒ 훽) = 12 then [(훼 ⇒ 훽)∗]퐿3 ≥ 12 and this last value may be
1.
We oﬀer a simple check–up on Proposition 6. In case 1, we have 푔 ⊆ ((푈 ∖
[훼]) ∪ [훽]). For the value of [(훼 ⇒ 훽)∗], consider some subcases. Subcase 1.1:
푔 ⊆ 푈 ∖ [훼]. Then [훼∗] = 0 and [(훼 ⇒ 훽)∗] =[훼∗] ⇒ [훽∗] is always 1 regardless
of a value of [훽∗]. Subcase 1.2: 푔 ∩ [훼] ∕= ∅ ∕= 푔 ∖ [훼] so [훼∗] = 12 . Then 푔 ∩ [훽] = ∅
is impossible, i.e., [훽∗]is at least 12 and [(훼 ⇒ 훽)∗]=1. Subcase 1.3: 푔 ⊆ [훼] so
[훼∗] = 1; then 푔 ⊆ [훽] must hold, i.e., [훽∗] = 1 which means that [(훼⇒ 훽)∗]=1.
For case 2, we have 푔 ∩ ((푈 ∖ [훼]) ∪ [훽]) = ∅ hence 푔 ∩ [훽] = ∅ and 푔 ⊆ [훼],
i.e., [훼∗] = 1, [훽∗] = 0 so [훼∗]⇒ [훽∗]=0.
In case 3, we have 푔∩((푈 ∖ [훼])∪ [훽]) ∕= ∅ and 푔∩ [훼]∖ [훽] ∕= ∅. Can [훼∗]⇒ [훽∗]
be necessarily 0? This would mean that [훼∗] = 1 and [훽∗] = 0, i.e., 푔 ⊆ [훼] and
푔 ∩ [훽] = ∅ but then 푔 ∩ ((푈 ∖ [훼]) ∪ [훽]) = ∅, a contradiction. Thus the value
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[훼∗]⇒ [훽∗] is at least 12 . In the subcase: 푔 ⊆ [훼], 푔 ∩ [훽] ∕= ∅ ∕= 푔 ∖ [훽], the value
of [훼∗]⇒ [훽∗] is 0⇒퐿 12 = 1, and the subcase is consistent with case 3.
5.1 Dependencies and decision rules
It is an important feature of rough set theory that it allows for an elegant
formulation of the problem of dependency between two sets of attributes, cf.,
[13], in terms of indiscernibility relations.
We recall, see sect.1 that for two sets 퐶,퐷 ⊆ 퐴 of attributes, one says that
퐷 depends functionally on 퐶 when 퐼푁퐷(퐶) ⊆ 퐼푁퐷(퐷), symbolically denoted
퐶 7→ 퐷. Functional dependence can be represented locally by means of functional
dependency rules of the form
휙퐶({푣푎 : 푎 ∈ 퐶})⇒ 휙퐷({푤푎 : 푎 ∈ 퐷}), (13)
where 휙퐶({푣푎 : 푎 ∈ 퐶}) is the formula
⋀
푎∈퐶(푎 = 푣푎), and [휙퐶 ] ⊆ [휙퐷].
Clearly, if 훼 : 휙퐶 ⇒ 휙퐷 is a functional dependency rule as in (13), then 훼
is a theorem of logic induced by 휈3.
Indeed, for each granule 푔, we have 푔 ∩ [휙퐶 ] ⊆ [휙퐷]. Let us observe that
the converse statement is also true: if a formula 훼 : 휙퐶 ⇒ 휙퐷 is a theorem
of logic induced by 휈3 then this formula is a functional dependency rule in the
sense of (13). Indeed, assume that 훼 is not any functional dependency rule, i.e.,
[휙퐶 ] ∖ [휙퐷] ∕= ∅. Taking [휙퐶 ] as the witness granule 푔, we have that 푔 is not any
subset of [훼], i.e, 퐼∨휈3(푔)(훼) ≤ 12 , so 훼 is not true at 푔, a fortiori it is no theorem.
Let us observe that these characterizations are valid for each regular rough
inclusion on sets 휈.
A more general and also important notion is that of a local proper depen-
dency: a formula 휙퐶 ⇒ 휙퐷 where 휙퐶({푣푎 : 푎 ∈ 퐶}) is the formula
⋀
푎∈퐶(푎 = 푣푎),
similarly for 휙퐷, is a local proper dependency when [휙퐶 ] ∩ [휙퐷] ∕= ∅.
We will say that a formula 훼 is acceptable with respect to a collection 푀 of
worlds when 퐼∨휈3(푔)(훼) ≥ 12 for each world 푔 ∈푀 , i.e, when 훼 is false at no world
푔 ∈푀 . Then,
if a formula 훼 : 휙퐶 ⇒ 휙퐷 is a local proper dependency rule, then it is
acceptable with respect to all C-exact worlds.
Indeed, for a C–exact granule 푔, the case that 퐼∨휈3(푔)(훼) = 0 means that
푔 ⊆ [휙퐶 ] and 푔 ∩ [휙퐷] = ∅; as 푔 is C–exact and [휙퐶 ] is a C–indiscernibility class,
either [휙퐶 ] ⊆ 푔 or [휙퐶 ] ∩ 푔 = ∅. When [휙퐶 ] ⊆ 푔 then [휙퐶 ] = 푔 which makes
푔 ∩ [휙퐷] = ∅ impossible. When [휙퐶 ] ∩ 푔 = ∅, then 푔 ∩ [휙퐷] = ∅ is impossible. In
either case, 퐼∨휈3(푔)(훼) = 0 cannot be satisﬁed with any C–exact granule 푔.
Again, the converse is true: when 훼 is not local proper, i.e., [휙퐶 ] ∩ [휙퐷] = ∅,
then 푔 = [휙퐶 ] does satisfy 퐼
∨
휈3(푔)(훼) = 0.
A corollary of the same forms follows for decision rules in a given decision
system (푈,퐴, 푑), i.e., dependencies of the form 휙퐶 ⇒ (푑 = 푤).
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6 Conclusions
Intensional logics 푔푟푚휈 capture the basic aspects of reasoning in rough set theory
as the construction of such logic is oriented toward logical dependency between
premises and conclusions of an implicative rule.
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